Publications + Presentations

Summary

• The Supreme Court of Ohio held in Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A. that Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), has no one-use limit.
• A time-barred claim can be refiled more than once, as long as each new action is commenced within one year of the prior dismissal (or within the original limitations period, if later).
• Dismissals without prejudice may offer less finality than litigants expect, which affects decisions about dismissals, settlement and document preservation.

---

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s October 15, 2026, decision in Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4001 reiterates that Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A) (often called the “savings statute”), does not contain a “one-use” limitation, and confirms that a claim that is otherwise time-barred and has already relied on Ohio’s savings statute may continue to proceed in successive refilings, so long as each new “action” satisfies the requirements of the savings statute. Simply put, a plaintiff may dismiss and refile her time-barred claim more than once if the savings statute’s other conditions are met.

The decision affects how Ohio litigants should evaluate the applicable statutes of limitations, voluntary dismissals, and the potential lack of finality of multiple dismissals without prejudice.

What Happened in Kohn?

The dispute arose from an investment-management relationship between Kohn and Glenmede Trust Company, N.A. In November 2016, Kohn filed an action asserting claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel (“Kohn I”). In September 2017, he voluntarily dismissed the action under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) and commenced a second action within one year of the dismissal (“Kohn II”). At that point, the statute of limitations on Kohn’s negligence claim had expired.

The trial court dismissed Kohn II without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(2) in August 2022. Kohn then commenced an action for the third time in January 2023 (“Kohn III”), again within one year of the most recent (second) dismissal.

Glenmede moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Kohn had already invoked the savings statute once when he filed Kohn II and could not use it again to pursue the time-barred negligence claim. The trial court agreed and entered judgment for Glenmede.

On appeal to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the court took a claim-by-claim approach. It concluded that Kohn’s negligence claim was barred because the limitations period had expired before Kohn II was filed and the claim had therefore already received the benefit of the savings statute and could not be used again. But the court permitted Kohn’s fraud, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims to proceed because their limitations period had not expired when Kohn II was filed. In the court’s view, those three claims relied on the savings statute for the first time only when Kohn III was filed.

The Eighth District then certified a conflict with the Fifth District’s ruling in McGowan v. Family Medicine, Inc., 2002-Ohio-4071 (5th Dist.) that the savings statute applies to an “action” as a whole rather than to individual claims. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted both the certified conflict and Glenmede’s discretionary appeal.

How Did the Court Apply the Savings Statute to Time-Barred Claims?

The Supreme Court rejected the premise that Ohio courts must determine, claim by claim, whether a particular cause of action (e.g., Kohn’s negligence claim) previously received the benefit of the savings statute after becoming time-barred. Instead, the Court focused on the language of R.C. 2305.19(A), which permits a plaintiff whose action fails otherwise than on the merits to commence a new “action” within one year of that failure or within the original limitations period, whichever is later.

Relying on its 2024 decision in McCullough v. Bennett, 2024-Ohio-2783, the Court reiterated that the savings statute contains no express one-use restriction. The Court explained that once an action has been timely commenced, the savings statute does not limit the number of later actions that may be commenced in accordance with its requirements. Specifically, a successive filing qualifies under the savings statute when (i) the preceding action failed otherwise than on the merits (namely, voluntary dismissal or dismissals without prejudice); and (ii) the new action was commenced within one year of that failure or within the limitations period, whichever is later.

Because Kohn II was properly commenced under the savings statute, was dismissed without prejudice, and Kohn III was filed within one year of Kohn II’s dismissal, Kohn III satisfied the Ohio savings statute despite it already being used once before. The Court held that the savings statute preserved the entire action, including the negligence claim whose limitations period expired before the second filing. The Court affirmed the reinstatement of the fraud, contract, and promissory-estoppel claims, reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Court briefly acknowledged concerns that its interpretation could facilitate serial dismissals and refilings, taking the position that Civ.R. 41(A)(1)’s double-dismissal rule and the court’s discretion to grant a dismissal with prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(2) provide safeguards against abuse. The Court seemed to suggest that if multiple refilings were a problem, the remedy was legislative, rather than judicial.

What Does Kohn Mean for Ohio Litigants?

For litigants, this means that the expiration of the original statute of limitations will not necessarily end the litigation following dismissal without prejudice. Nor can litigants assume that a time-barred claim becomes permanently barred merely because it previously depended on a one-time use of the savings statute. Consequently, dismissal without prejudice may provide substantially less finality than previously assumed. For plaintiffs, the decision offers a way to preserve claims after a dismissal without prejudice, but each new action must still be commenced within one year of the dismissal (or within the original limitations period, if later), and the double-dismissal rule in Civ.R. 41(A)(1) still applies.

Now, litigants should carefully evaluate with counsel whether a proposed dismissal may permit an action to be refiled, and where appropriate, whether a dismissal with prejudice or other stipulated limitations on refiling are warranted. Litigants should also avoid treating a dismissal without prejudice as the practical end of a matter when making decisions about document preservation, litigation holds, insurance reporting, and witness availability.

If you have questions about how the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kohn and its application of the savings statute may affect pending claims, potential dismissals, or your litigation strategy, please contact Nick Bobb or Mikenna Cimini of Kegler Brown Hill + Ritter’s Litigation practice.