On its last day of the 2007 term, the United States Supreme Court
abandoned a nearly century-old antitrust precedent that made vertical
price-fixing agreements illegal. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled
that it was not an automatic, or per se, violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act for a manufacturer and its distributor to agree on the
minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufacturer's products.
The decision gives manufacturers more power to control the retail
prices of their products after being distributed to retailers nationwide.
The nation’s highest court adopted the per se rule against vertical
price restraints in 1911, when it found that the Dr. Miles Medical
Company's practice of requiring retail druggists to adhere to set
prices violated the free-trade principles of the Sherman Act. Until
now, the Court has consistently interpreted the Dr. Miles
decision as establishing a "bright line rule that agreements
fixing minimum resale prices are per se illegal." Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2725 (2007).
However, it revisited the issue in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., adopting a different standard of analysis
for determining whether a vertical price agreement between a manufacturer
and its distributor violates federal antitrust law.
In Leegin, the Court found the per se rule was outdated in
light of modern economic analyses revealing that minimum resale price
maintenance can have pro-competitive effects, such as stimulating
interbrand competition. According to the Court, because vertical agreements
establishing minimum resale prices can "have either pro-competitive
or anticompetitive effects, depending on the circumstances in which
they are formed," (Id. at syllabus ¶ 3) the agreements
are "ill suited" for "per se condemnation." Id.at
2718. In place of the per se rule, Justice Kennedy instructed judges
to apply the "rule of reason." Under the "rule of reason,"
courts will determine whether vertical price-fixing agreements violate
antitrust laws on a case-by-case basis by weighing a specific restraint's
effect on competition. This decision represents a major change in
the area of antitrust law and no doubt will have a significant impact
on litigation in this area.
The
U.S. Supreme Court has taken a step in reducing the number of frivolous
lawsuits and the amount spent in wasteful discovery efforts. It may
now be easier for defendants to file a successful motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly,
it may be more difficult for plaintiffs to have their day in court
due to heightened pleading standards and a greater likelihood that
their case will be thrown out.
In May, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated a long-standing
procedural rule by deciding Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Since 1957, motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) were held to a stringent standard
articulated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Under Conley,
"a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief." Conley at 45-46. Bell Atlantic
explicitly rejects the "no set of facts" language, Bell
Atlantic at 1969, and adopts a new standard based on the plausibility
of the complaint. Now, a plaintiff's complaint must allege sufficient
facts to demonstrate that the claim is "plausible on its face."
Bell Atlantic at 1974.
If a complaint can be dismissed more easily under a "plausibility"
standard, then it reasonably follows that Bell Atlantic
also raises the bar for a viable complaint. According to Conley,
under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
need only be "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief" so that the defendant
has notice of the claim and "the grounds on which it rests."
Conley at 47. In Bell Atlantic, the Court notes
that these "grounds" should be more factually-oriented
than a simple list of elements and conclusions for each cause of
action. The complaint must allege facts that "nudge …
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell
Atlantic at 1974. This heightened pleading requirement may
pose problems for plaintiffs who do not possess the evidence necessary
to allege certain facts, but would otherwise obtain such evidence
(from the defendant) during the discovery process. Scott Dodson,
Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 93 VA.
L. REV. IN BRIEF 121, 124 (2007).
The antitrust context of Bell Atlantic sheds some light
on the Court's reasons for such a shift. The Court's underlying
concern was the costly discovery process involved in a typical class
action antitrust lawsuit. In the class action securities fraud context,
the Court has gone a step further to require that securities fraud
pleadings "give rise to a strong inference of scienter,"
a mental state of deception, manipulation, or fraudulence. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makur Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509
(2007). However, regardless of the Court's motivations, the language
of Bell Atlantic clearly extends the new plausibility standard
beyond either the antitrust or class action contexts. Dodson at
124.
In Bell Atlantic, the Court carefully qualifies its holding
by stating that plausibility does not equal probability, and that
recovery can still be very remote and unlikely. Bell Atlantic
at 1965. However, academic commentators predict that Bell Atlantic
will have an impact on the content of pleadings, the frequency of
dismissal motions filed under Rule 12(b)(6) and the regularity with
which these motions will be granted. Dodson at 126.
Facing
a potential lawsuit or liability claim can be a frightening situation,
especially if it is uncharted territory. Of course, contacting your
lawyer is a good starting point when faced with a claim. Another necessary
step, whether you have been served a formal complaint or a simple
demand letter, is examining any applicable insurance policies to determine
if the claim may be covered. If the claim is arguably or potentially
covered by the insurance policy, your insurance company has a duty
to defend the claim, which usually means the insurer will provide
you with counsel and pay all necessary defense costs. Willoughby
Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 177.
Insurance law in Ohio is governed upon a purely contractual basis,
making your coverage rights dependent upon your policy from your
insurance company. To find if the claim is covered, you will need
to read your insurance policy to find which type of coverage it
ensures in regard to timing of claims and the coverage available.
There are two different types of insurance policies with two different
coverage plans: occurrence-based and claims-made policies. Occurrence
policies obligate the insurance company to cover and defend against
any claim that occurred during the period of time you had the policy,
regardless of when the claim was actually served. Claims-made policies
cover a claim that was made during the lifetime of the policy. Under
a claims-made policy, if your claim was filed after your insurance
policy had terminated, the insurance company has no duty to defend
the claim. If you change from a claims-made to an occurrence policy,
it is important to purchase coverage for claims that may not be
covered by either policy - this is usually referred to as “gap
coverage.” You should talk in detail to your insurance agent
about whether or not you are fully covered.
If the claim has been filed within the timing of your coverage,
you then need to see if the particular claim is covered under your
policy. This is important because an insurer's duty to defend is
based on the scope of allegations of the claim. National Engineering
& Contracting Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
(10th Dist. 2004), 2004-Ohio-2503. Each policy sets out the general
coverage of the individual policy within the initial coverage sections.
It is also important to check that your claim has not been excluded
elsewhere in the policy. Insurance companies will generally provide
a broad coverage plan in the beginning of the policy and whittle
down their actual liability through multiple exclusions and limitation
sections. Your insurance policy will also have a section of definitions
defining the words used within the policy; be sure to check these
definitions since basic words could have different meanings according
to your insurance policy.
Once you have determined that your claim is covered within your
policy, you will need to contact your insurance company and notify
them of the claim. You do not need to have an actual lawsuit in
progress to notify your insurance company; any claim or demand letter
triggers the insurance company's duty to defend. However, you have
an obligation to the insurer to notify it of a claim. The easiest
way to notify the company would be to contact your insurance agent
or the insurance company's claim department.
If your insurance company denies coverage for a claim that you
believe should be covered under the policy, you can seek a declaratory
judgment from a court stating that the claim is covered. In Ohio,
the interpretation of an insurance contract is ordinarily a question
of law to be decided by the court, and where the policy terms and
coverage are ambiguous, the court will construe the policy in a
light most favorable for the insured, erring on the side of coverage
against the insurance company's unwillingness to defend. National
Engineering & Contracting Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. (10th Dist. 2004), 2004-Ohio-2503. Unfortunately,
it is only in extreme circumstances that you can recover the cost
of bringing a declaratory judgment action against your insurer.
This article is meant for informational purposes only, and should
not be relied on as legal advice. If you have any further questions
about whether a claim is covered by an insurance policy, or would
like help in seeking a declaratory judgment, please contact Kegler,
Brown, Hill & Ritter.
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter's Advocate: The Litigation Newsletter is edited by Jennifer L. Mackanos for the Litigation practice group.
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