Ohio’s Sunshine Law, Section 121.22 of the Revised Code,
requires that a public agency, including a PHA, adequately specify
the specific purpose for entering into a closed executive session.
In a recent case involving a Park District, the plaintiff sought
a $500 civil forfeiture penalty for each of twenty meetings (i.e.,
$10,000) where the Park District went into executive session. The
only notations in the District’s minutes were that the executive
session was to discuss “personnel matters.” The Court
ruled that the Sunshine Law was violated because the District failed
to “fully specify” its basis for entering executive
session by demoting “the precise type of personnel matters
it would address, such as hiring, discipline, termination, etc.”
Although the Court found a violation, it awarded only one $500 penalty
and did not aggregate or “stack” the separate meeting
violations, because it found the violations were “technical”
and there was no intent to conceal the overall purpose of the executive
session. Under the statute, the plaintiff was also entitled to recover
her attorney fees. [Weisbarth v. Geauga Park District,
2007-Ohio-6728 (Gea. Co. 2007)].
Recent amendments to the Ohio Public Records law affect public
housing authorities in Ohio. The amendments, which became effective
last September, arguably require housing authorities and other public
entities to adopt and maintain both a records retention schedule
and a written policy for responding to public records requests.
All public offices now must also create and display a poster summarizing
the office’s public records policy.
In addition, the amendments require public offices:
to notify the person requesting a record if the record being
supplied has been redacted (unless the redaction is plainly visible);
to provide an explanation of the reasons, including legal authority,
for the denial of any request; and
to provide the author of an ambiguous or overly broad request
with the opportunity to revise the request.
The new law also generally precludes a public office from limiting
or conditioning the availability of public records by requiring
disclosure of the requester’s identity or the intended use
of the requested record. A public office is permitted to ask that
a request be made in writing, ask for the requester’s identity,
and ask about the intended use of the requested information only
if the public office discloses to the requester that compliance
is not required and the written request or disclosure of
the identity or intended use would enhance the ability to comply
with the request.
A public housing authority created under Ohio Revised Code Chapter
3735 is generally regarded as a political subdivision of the State
and is, therefore, a “public office” subject to the
Ohio Public Records law.
Federal regulations allow PHAs, when they consider whether to terminate
Section 8 assistance, to consider all relevant, mitigating circumstances
involving the tenant. The Massachusetts Supreme Court recently issued
a restrictive and demanding ruling on this point. [Carter v.
Lynn Housing Auth., 450 Mass. 626 (Mass. S. Ct. 2008)].
In this case the Section 8 landlord prevailed in court and recovered
against the tenant for excessive damages. The PHA then held a hearing,
after which the hearing officer terminated the tenant’s Section
8 subsidy. The tenant then challenged the termination of the assistance.
The court ruled that the termination ruling was invalid, primarily
on procedural grounds. Although the court agreed that a tenant must
maintain the leased property according to HQS standards, and that
a PHA can terminate the subsidy for the tenant’s failure to
do so, this court held that the following must exist for a hearing
officer’s decision to terminate assistance to be valid:
The hearing officer must understand and state that he or she
has discretion to consider all the relevant and mitigating circumstances;
The hearing officer must issue a written decision, stating the
reasons and grounds upon which the decision is based;
The decision must address factual and credibility determinations,
and whether the tenant’s circumstances and “mitigating
factors” were considered; and
The decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence
before the hearing officer.
In the court’s view, if the hearing officer’s decision
does not incorporate these essential requirements, it does not suffice
to terminate Section 8 assistance.
[Source: Housing Development Reporter; 3/3/08 issue.]
Federal law allows PHAs to evict tenants for criminal activity
by a tenant or member of the household. The issue that arose in
one case was whether this federal provision applies even if the
terms of the “one-strike” law are not specifically written
into the tenant’s lease. The federal court in the District
of Columbus ruled that it does not. [Pratt v. Dist. of Columbia
Housing Authority, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 24428 (D.C. Cir. 2008)].
The case involved an eviction because a household member was driving
a stolen vehicle. Although the lease permitted eviction for conduct
that disturbed the peace, or was unsafe or unsanitary, it did not
expressly allow no-fault eviction for one-time criminal activity.
The PHA argued that the federal one-strike policy should be read
into the lease, even if it wasn’t specifically written. The
court disagreed. Thus, in order to rely on the federal one-strike
eviction policy, those terms must be expressly included in the tenant’s
lease.
[Source: Housing Development Reporter; 3/3/08 issue.]
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter's Housing Newsletter is prepared by Lawrence F. Feheley.
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