Many PHAs have considered and/or adopted Minority Business plans,
designed to increase minority participation in PHA contracts and
expenditures. A recent appellate court decision in Ohio, while not
involving a PHA, casts doubt on the legality of many of these plans.
In Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
2006-Ohio-6452 (Ham. Co. 2006), the City had a “Small Business
Enterprise” program, whereby bidders for construction contracts
were evaluated on the basis of a “good faith effort”
to meet the City’s proposed SBE participation goal (which
in this instance was 35%). The qualified SBE subcontractors were
essentially minority subcontractors. The bid of the Cleveland Construction
Company was not accepted because of its failure to achieve the 35%
SBE participation. They sued.
The appeals court ruled that the SBE bid criterion was unconstitutional,
even though it called only for good faith efforts and not rigid
quotas. The court found that the requirement “pressured or
encouraged” contractors to hire minority subcontractors, which
constituted an unconstitutional racial preference.
Melinda Smith participated in the Section 8 voucher program in
Hamilton County, Ohio, administered through the Hamilton County
Department of Community Development. She lived in the unit with
her two minor sons. In July, 2000, when the police found that the
children had been left alone in deplorable conditions, the two boys
were removed and placed in the custody of their grandmother. Thereafter,
the two boys returned to live with their mother, even though custody
was not returned to her. When the State learned the boys were living
with their mother, in April, 2003, they were returned once again
to the grandmother. The boys then stayed with Ms. Smith on weekends,
holidays, and during the summer.
When Smith completed her application for Section 8 assistance, she
listed the two boys as family members and she was approved for a
two-bedroom unit. Her only source of income was Social Security
benefits for one of her sons who was disabled. When the Social Security
Administration notified her that she was not entitled to the disability
benefits because she did not have custody of the son, she went to
the PHA to report a diminished change in her household income. When
the PHA learned that she did not have custody of the boys, it terminated
her Section 8 assistance because she had listed the sons as household
members. Ms. Smith appealed her termination to the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas.
The County defended on the ground that HUD Regulations, 24 C.F.R.
§982.552, provide that a PHA may terminate assistance if any
member of the family has “committed fraud, bribery, or any
other corrupt criminal act” in connection with a federal housing
program. Since Smith fraudulently claimed her sons were living with
her, in order to live in a larger unit and receive a higher rent
subsidy, the PHA argued the termination was justified.
The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County disagreed. The court ruled
that it would not allow a termination of assistance “for any
and all errors arising from the failure to submit true or complete
information.” Instead, in order to terminate assistance the
tenant must have acted “fraudulently” in listing her
sons as household members. In this case, the court found that no
fraud was proven:
“Because neither the federal regulations nor DCD’s administrative
plan specifically define the meaning of a household member or family
composition, we are only left with the general guidelines of Section
982.201, Title 24, C.F.R. and the code’s requirement that
“no other person [i.e., nobody but members of the assisted
family] may reside in the unit.” Under this section, a family
can include a single person or a group of persons including a child
or children. The code does not distinguish between children who
spend time between two households, as the case may be with divorced
parents, nor does it require that an adult have legal custody of
a child for the child to be considered a household member. But the
code does state that “a child who is temporarily away from
the home because of placement in foster care is considered a member
of the family.” Based on these regulations, we are convinced
that it was perfectly reasonable for Smith to have listed her children
as household members because they spent weekends, holidays, and
summers with her.”
Since there was no proof of fraud in this case, the Court ruled
that the PHA did not have the right to terminate the Section 8 voucher
assistance. [Smith v. Hamilton County, 2007-Ohio-1725 (Ham.
Co. 2007)].
A similar case arose in Massachusetts. In that case, the PHA terminated
a tenant’s Section 8 voucher because she did not report her
husband as a family member or his income as family income. Gammons
v. Mass. Dept. of Housing and Comm. Dev., 2007 WL 1385704 (D.
Mass. 2007). However, unlike the Ohio case, this case did not appear
to be an innocent or justifiable failure to provide information.
In the Gammons case, the PHA had evidence that the tenant’s
husband lived in the unit, he listed the tenant’s address
as his address on his driver’s license, the husband’s
bills were sent to the tenant’s address, and the tenant had
a joint bank account with her husband. Nonetheless, the tenant claimed
that her husband did not live with her.
The PHA determined that the tenant falsified her family composition
and family income. The federal court, reviewing the PHA findings
and applying a deferential standard of review, ruled that the PHA
properly terminated the Section 8 assistance.
Can Section 8 Residency with
a Relative be Allowed?
HUD Regulations prohibit a Section 8 tenant from using the assistance
payment to rent from a blood relative who also lives in the assisted
unit. 24 C.F.R. §982.615(b). That prohibition seems to be fairly
straightforward and unambiguous. However, as is the case in many
situations, the clear mandate may not suffice where a disability
is involved.
In Garcia v. Washington Dept. of Housing Services, 2006
WL 897987 (D. Ore. 2006), a Section 8 tenant sought a reasonable
accommodation in the form of a waiver from the rule to allow him
to lease a unit from his brother. The tenant suffered from schizophrenia,
and he claimed that he had to live with his brother because (a)
the tenant required assistance and the voucher was the only way
he could compensate his brother for his housing and care, and (b)
without rental assistance his brother could not afford to live with
and care for the tenant. The PHA denied his accommodation request
on the ground that the HUD Regulations prohibit the living arrangement.
However, the HUD Regulations also provide that the PHA may approve
such a living arrangement if the PHA “determines that approving
the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member
who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. §982.306(d).
The Court essentially ruled that the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§3604, which requires accommodation of the disabled, trumps
the HUD Regulations. Therefore, a PHA has an “affirmative
obligation” to make a reasonable accommodation in order to
allow a disabled tenant to live in an assisted unit, even if it
means modifying or making an exception to administrative rules and
policies.
[Source: Housing Development Reporter, Current
Developments, 4/24/2006 issue, pp. 280-281].
HQS Violations and Section 8 Assistance
Termination
How much does a PHA have to consider “mitigating circumstances”
when terminating a Section 8 tenant’s assistance for breach
of HQS standards? According to an appellate court in Massachusetts,
the PHA does not have to take mitigating factors into account. Carter
v. Lynn Housing Authority, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 117 (Mass. App.
2006).
In this case the PHA notified the tenant that Section 8 assistance
was to be terminated for violation of HQS standards and damage to
the housing unit. After the termination was upheld in the PHA’s
hearing process, the tenant appealed to the state court. The trial
court ruled that the PHA was required to consider other factors
in making the assistance termination decision, such as “the
seriousness of the case, the culpability of individual family members,
mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member
and the effects of termination of assistance on other family members.”
The trial court ordered that the assistance be reinstated.
The appellate court did not agree. The appeals court relied on HUD
Regulations, which require assisted families to comply with HQS,
and which require PHAs to take prompt and vigorous action when the
standards are violated. Although the PHA “may” consider
other factors beyond the HQS violations, it is not required to do
so. 24 C.F.R. §982.552.
[Source: Housing Development Reporter, Current
Developments, 5/8/2006 issue, p. 312].
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter's Housing Newsletter is prepared by Lawrence F. Feheley.
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