Courts in Ohio have traditionally been very liberal in determining
what constitutes a last date of work on a construction project
for purposes of determining the expiration of a contractor's
or subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights. Basically Courts have
ruled that if the work is necessary to complete the project (even
if a relatively minor punchlist item) then this is a legitimate
last date of work so long as the purpose of the work was not
to artificially extend lien rights.
The principle was vindicated and may have been extended in a
recent trial court decision by Judge Travis of the Franklin County
Common Pleas Court in the case of Gauer-Jeffrey
Design & Construction v. Roderick H. Dillon, Case
No. 02CVE-04-4570.
Judge Travis ruled that a project manager's telephone calls
to inform the owner of the status of certain items constituted
labor for the purposes of determining the last date of work.
He then applied the general rule that if the labor and materials
were provided at the request and with the knowledge of the owner,
to remedy defects in the original work, this is sufficient to
establish a new period from which the time for filing the Affidavit
of Mechanic's Lien is to be computed.
Therefore, subcontractors and contractors may justifiably rely
upon the owner's request to remedy certain defects as the basis
for determining their last date of work for the purposes of filing
a mechanic's lien. The interesting twist on this case is that
even something like walking the job site to inspect the work
or contacting the customer to report the status of work may also
constitute "labor" and be relied upon for the last
date of work.
In a long running legal battle with the University of Cincinnati
involving unbid work on a "lease-leaseback" project,
the Mechanical Contractors have sought not only to have their
principle vindicated but also to recover their attorney's fees
or other monetary damages.
An earlier Court of Appeals decision suggested that some sort
of money damages were appropriate and remanded the case back
to the Court of Claims who subsequently ruled that no money damages
were proven in this case.
The second Tenth District Court of Appeals decision rendered
on April 10, 2003 (No. 02AP-689) found that (1) "reliance" for
a promissory estoppel claim was lacking because the University
did not represent that competitive bidding would apply norwas
there a court ruling declaring the unbid process illegal; (2)
that the prior declaratory judgment statute did not entitle one
to attorney's fees; and (3) while attorney's fees might potentially
be recoverable against the State under R.C. § 2335.39 that
opportunity was lost when these fees were not sought within 30
days after final judgment, thereby denying any recovery of monetary
damages to the successful litigants.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals, repeated that "monetary
damages may potentially be available as a remedy where injunctive
relief no longer provides a practical remedy to disappointed
bidders" but warned:
"it may be problematic for bidders to actually recover
such monetary damages, as this case demonstrates. We caution
that the most appropriate and effective relief available in
such situations is for bidders to seek early injunctive relief
to enforce the competitive bidding laws, even though such injunctive
relief was concededly ineffectual here due to the unique facts
and procedural complexities of this case."
This case re-emphasized the great difficulty presented in bid
challenge cases, particularly the difficulty in receiving any
sort of compensation should the contract be unlawfully denied
the disgruntled bidder. Prompt action is always required to seek
injunctive relief.
It is a general rule that a party must substantially perform
its obligations under a contract to recover for breach of contract.
A case of the Franklin County Court of Appeals recently dealt
with this important issue and found that a contractor does not
breach a contract when the amount of non-conforming work is nominal,
or in other words, the unperformed or wrongfully performed work
does not destroy the value or purpose of the contract. Hansel
v. Creative Concrete & Masonry Constr. Co., 148 Ohio
App. 3d 53 (2002).
In that case there was inadequate thickness of concrete as well
as cracking and spalling. The deficiencies were not enough to
warrant replacement of the concrete driveway, so the court found
that a deduction could be made by the owner for the cost of repair
but allowed the contractor to recover the balance of contract
because it had still substantially performed its contractual
obligations.
The Construction Law group has been named by Chambers
USA as the second most outstanding construction law team
in Ohio and Don
Gregory was named as the second highest rated individual
in the state for construction law. Mike
Copley and Stu
Harris won a jury verdict in the Gauer-Jeffrey
case. Mike Copley serves on ABC's and CISCA's task forces
on mold and has been regularly speaking and writing on mold
issues for several national associations.
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter's Construction Law Newsletter is prepared by Donald W. Gregory for the Construction Law practice group.
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