It is increasingly common for those in the construction industry
to encounter indemnity provisions in their contracts, that being
an agreement where one party, the promisor, agrees to protect
and hold harmless the other party, the promisee, from liability
arising from personal injury or property damage on the job. These
provisions, in essence, can shift the risk of liability from
a negligent party, the promisee, to an innocent party, the promisor,
and therefore have been justly criticized as being unfair.
Ohio has a statute, Ohio Revised Code §2305.31, which provides
that an indemnity provision in a construction contract that purports
to indemnify and hold harmless a party from his own negligence
is void as against public policy and unenforceable. This statute
has been interpreted to mean that the promisor (i.e. general
contractor) cannot be required to indemnify the promisee (i.e.,
owner) for the promisee's own negligence or even that of the
promisor himself if he is an independent contractor of the promisee. Durgin
v. Dugan & Meyers Constr., Inc., (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d
326. It has also been interpreted to prohibit the shifting of
liability arising from the negligence of the promisee, regardless
of whether such negligence is sole or concurrent. Kendall
v. U.S. Dismantling Co., (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 61. This
means that such a prohibition is applicable whether the promisee
(i.e. owner) is 1% negligent or 100% negligent.
Based upon these cases, we have traditionally advised contractors
and subcontractors that they should not worry too much about
these indemnity provisions believing that they were unenforceable.
However, a recent Court of Appeals case out of Dayton, Moore
v. Dayton Power and Light Company, 99 Ohio App.3d 138,
held differently, and determined that hold harmless language
insisting that the contractor pay the owner's attorney's fees
and expenses (but not the damages for the injuries suffered by
the injured employee) incurred by the owner in defending a claim
asserted by the contractor's injured employee was enforceable.
This case appears to carve out a new exception to the general
unenforceability of such provisions under Ohio law.
This means that while a contractor should be protected against
an injured employee's direct claims under worker's compensation,
if he sued or threatened to sue the owner, the contractor may
be liable (at a minimum) for the owner's attorney's fees and
costs. The same problem exists for subcontractors who sign such
provisions obligating them to pay the contractor's attorney's
fees and expenses. In view of this case, it is increasingly important
for subcontractors and contractors to closely scrutinize their
contracts and modify the indemnification provisions appropriately.
Specialty Contractors Required to Subcontract
to MBEs
The recent Franklin County Court of appeals case of J.A.
Croson Company v. Ohio DAS, No. 94APE-09-1406 (unreported
6/22/95) has determined that specialty contractors still have
to subcontract from a minority business enterprise (MBE). Croson
had argued that the 7% MBE requirement on state specialty contracts
could be satisfied by its purchase of materials or services
(rather than subcontracts) from MBEs. However, the Court ruled
that there must be some subcontracting to an MBE on every contract
within the 7% context and that the value of services could
not exceed 5% of the contract amount. Therefore, the law could
be satisfied by buying MBE services of 5%, supplies of 1% and
subcontracting 1% of the total contract value.
A more conservative U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that federal
set-aside programs must be examined with the same skepticism
or "strict scrutiny" as state and local programs. This
ruling would appear to signal the same slow, steady demise for
many federal affirmative action programs that has been previously
experienced over the last few years with respect to racially
based state and local plans.
In the landmark case, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, the white Colorado guardrail contractor
who submitted the low bid but lost out to a Hispanic firm successfully
argued that federal record classifications should be reviewed
with "strict scrutiny" and that discrimination against
whites should be evaluated by the same standards as discrimination
against minorities.
The Supreme Court ruled that any official action that treats
a person differently on account of race or ethnic origin is "inherently
suspect and presumptively invalid." The Supreme Court did
not declare the federal DOT 10% set-aside program unconstitutional,
but instead remanded the case back to the trial court for application
of the "strict scrutiny" analysis to the facts in question.
Few set-aside programs have been able to survive such a "strict
scrutiny" test.
The recent financial demise of a well-known Central Ohio general
contractor has brought into focus a dangerous new contract provision
for subcontractors —one that attempts, in advance, to waive
all of the subcontractors' lien rights and any ability to collect
against a payment bond. Apparently in excess of 40 local subcontractors
signed subcontracts with language purporting to waive lien and
bond rights buried deep in this general contractor's subcontract
and now find themselves embroiled in litigation with the bonding
company as to whether such a provision is enforceable.
While there is an unreported Franklin County Court of Appeals
case from 1977 holding that such a "no lien" provision
is enforceable on a private project, there appears to be no Ohio
authority on whether such a provision is enforceable on public
projects, or as to payment bonds on either public or private
projects.
While such a provision may be of dubious enforceability in these
latter circumstances, many subcontractors will be forced to spend
money in Court to try to have these provisions found unenforceable
and risk a complete loss of any funds owed on these bonded projects.
Therefore, the importance of striking "no lien" or "no
bond rights" provisions from subcontracts, rather than assuming
them to be void as against public policy, should be apparent
to any party to a contract that may potentially need to assert
lien or bond rights.
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter's Construction Law Newsletter is prepared by Donald W. Gregory for the Construction Law practice group.
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